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NON-FORMAL PROCEDURE*
Thomas 0. Maint
The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock begins "Let us go then, you and I,
when the evening is spread out against the sky."' The promise of romance
quickly sobers with the next image: "a patient etherized upon a table." The
protagonist in the poem then meanders through "half-deserted streets," past
"one-night cheap hotels" and "sawdust restaurants with oyster shells" leading
to some destination, to wit: a social engagement and "an overwhelming ques-
tion."2 That question seems to be whether the protagonist should assert himself
and communicate with others at some level beyond the superficial.3
There are many potential themes and metaphors from the poem that would
work for a conference at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas entitled "Dispute
Resolution in the Twenty-First Century." Indeed, there is an air of romance to
a conference setting in Las Vegas, Nevada. A trek across the desert and into
the city paints a serviceable portrait of wandering through half-deserted streets,
one-night cheap hotels and sawdust restaurants with oyster shells. Further, my
designated task to find the common denominator that underlay the seemingly
unrelated comments of Professors Oakley and other Symposium contributors,
and to offer commentary thereupon, could easily lead one to become Eliot's
etherized patient. Yet I hope to draw a more profound parallel to that poem,
exploring at this engagement another question, one that I find somewhat over-
whelming, and one that likewise involves transcending the superficial. The
overwhelming question that I face upon reflection of the thoughtful work of the
papers presented is whether, or perhaps when, we should engage non-formal
procedure.
An amalgam of mediation, arbitration and more traditional forms of due
process will likely characterize dispute resolution in the twenty-first century.4
* Professor Main's published remarks were modified to delete references to a presenter's
work that was not included in the printed symposium.
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I T.S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF POETRY
1027 (Alexander W. Allison et al. eds., 1970).
2 Id.
I See generally FRANK KERMODE & JOHN HOLLANDER, MODERN BRITISH LITERATURE 463-
464 (Oxford 1973).
' See generally Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure for the Twenty-First Century,
77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 533 (2002); Stephen A. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Media-
tion: It's Here to Stay and Much Better Than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196 (2003); Edward J.
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Indeed, since the publication of Professor Frank Sander's classic piece, Vari-
eties of Dispute Processing, it has seemed inevitable that justice would be
administered by a diverse and integrated panoply of dispute resolution
processes.5 Burgeoning caseloads and the emergence of increasingly complex
cases may have accelerated this trend.6 Contemporary courts already rely
heavily on so-called alternative methods.7 Meanwhile, alternative methods
Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling, 3 NEV. L.J. 232 (2003); Paul Carrington, Self-
Deregulation, the "National Policy" of the Supreme Court, 3 NEV. L.J. 259 (2003).
5 See FRANK E.A. SANDER & A.B.A., Varities of Dispute Processing, THE POUND CONFER-
ENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 83 (Rand. Inst. for Civil Justice 1979)
("What I am thus advocating is a flexible and diverse panoply of dispute resolution
processes, with particular types of cases being assigned to differing processes (or combina-
tions of processes), according to some of the criteria mentioned."). See generally Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait
Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 297,
305 n.19, 309 (1996) (recognizing the 1976 Pound Conference as a "watershed and inaugu-
rating event" for alternative dispute resolution); Jean R. Stemlight, Is Binding Arbitration a
Form of ADR?: An Argument that the Term "ADR" has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness,
2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 97, 97 (describing Professor Sander as "one of the most prescient
commentators on the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement").
6 See generally Thomas E. Willging, Mass Torts Problems and Proposals: A Report to the
Mass Torts Working Group, 187 F.R.D. 328, 381-87 (1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Tak-
ing the Mass out of Mass Torts: Reflections of a Dalkon Shield Arbitrator on Alternative
Dispute Resolution, Judging, Neutrality, Gender and Process, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 513
(1998); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A More Complete Look at Complexity, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 781
(1998); Francis E. McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in Mass Tort Litiga-
tion, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1851 (1997); Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half
Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73
TEX. L. REV. 1587 (1995); Judith Resnik, Procedural Innovations, Sloshing Over: A Com-
ment on Deborah Hensler, A Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1995);
Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A
Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961 (1993); Linda S. Mullenix, Problems in Com-
plex Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 213 (1991); MARK A. PETERSON & MOLLY SELVIN, RESOLU-
TION OF MASS TORTS: TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF AGGREGATIVE
PROCEDURES 39-48 (1988).
7 See generally James J. Alfini, Mediation's Coming of (Legal) Age, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
153 (2002); Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Rec-
onciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and Confidential-
ity, 76 IND. L.J. 591 (2001); Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structures for the Delivery of
ADR Services by Courts: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 715
(1999); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Sunset, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 564-65, 588
(1998); Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through
ADR, 11 OHIo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1996); Stempel, supra note 5, at 297; Judith Res-
nik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10
OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 211, 214 (1995); Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of
Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 2169 (1993); Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion: What Form of Participation Should be Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079 (1993);
Sharon Press, Building and Maintaining a Statewide Mediation Program: A View from the
Field, 81 Ky. L.J. 1029 (1993); Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in
the Federal Courts, 76 IOWA L. REV. 889, 924 (1991); Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a
System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1 (1990); Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution,
62 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1987).
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have begun to ossify and formalize in a manner reminiscent of their traditional
antecedents. 8
Yet below the surface of this sophisticated network of formal rules are
legal norms that are not codified as formal rules but may be no less controlling.
The influence of these non-formal forms of law can explain dissonance
between form and practice.9 Make no mistake: I invented neither the realist
movement nor the internet.10 Nor am I either nostalgic or bold enough to label
this regurgitated realism as "post modem reconstructionalist neorealism" or
some such thing."' However, the influence of non-formal forms of law in the
I See generally Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic Move-
ment to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927 (2002);
Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949 (2000); Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing
the Conversation About the Current Status and the Future of ADR: A View from the Courts,
2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 11 (2000); Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite": Procedural
and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J.
1289 (1998); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of its Own:
Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871 (1997); Joshua D. Rosen-
berg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Empirical Analysis, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1487 (1994).
9 See generally Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988). See also Sarah
Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31 ARiz. ST. L.J. 291 (1999); Lynn M.
LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads, 90 Nw. U. L. REV.
1498 (1996); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty
Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 801
(1994); Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code Many Cultures, 67
AM. BANKR. L.J. 501 (1993).
10 For a discussion of the history of the realist movement, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATrERNS OF
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 65-159 (1995) (detailing the origins and history of the legal real-
ist movement); Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493, 500-
502 (1996) (brief history of realism). See generally Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal
Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279 (20013; Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a
Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267 (1997); Frank B. Cross, Political Science
and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U.
L. REV. 251 (1997).
The allusion to the invention of the internet refers to a 1999 interview of Vice President
Albert Gore by the Cable News Network's Wolf Blitzer during the 2000 electoral contest for
President of the United States. Mr. Gore, who was already perceived as prone to exaggerat-
ing his record, was lampooned for his statement "I took the initiative in creating the
Internet." See Transcript: Vice President Gore on CNN's 'Late Edition,' (March 9, 1999),
available at http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/03/09/president.2000/
transcript.gore/index.htmlhttp://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stries/999/3/9/president.
2000/transcript.gore/index.h (last accessed Feb. 8, 2003). See generally Katie Hafner, No
Father of Computing, but Maybe He's an Uncle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1999, at G3.
" By correspondence dated November 20, 2001, from conference organizers to the author,
placement in this Journal was assured prior to submission. Hence, no need for posturing
here! For a discussion about the selection criteria for law review scholarship, see, e.g.,
Nathan H. Saunders, Student-Edited Law Reviews: Reflections and Responses of an Inmate,
49 DUKE L.J. 1663 (2000); Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited Law
Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1131 (1995); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI.
L. REV. 527 (1994) ("Our scholarly journals are in the hands of incompetents .... ); Arthur
D. Austin, The "Custom of Vetting" as a Substitute for Peer Review, 32 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 4
(1990) ("The use of student edited journals as the main outlet for legal writing is an embar-
rassing situation deserving the smirks of disdain it gets from colleagues in the sciences and
humanities."); John G. Kester, Faculty Participation in the Student-Edited Law Review, 36 J.
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context of procedural rules raises an important, perhaps even overwhelming,
question, as we consider dispute resolution in the twenty-first century.
Professor Oakley's "A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts"
offers a useful state-by-state survey of textual conformity between state and
federal rules of civil procedure. 2 The Advisory Committee that drafted the
original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure anticipated, indeed promised, that the
Federal Rules would be so enlightened and simple that intra-state uniformity
would follow naturally as states voluntarily adopted the federal model.13 More
than six decades later, however, fewer than half of the United States have repli-
cated a substantial portion of the Federal Rules for their state court systems.' 4
Moreover, Professor Oakley concludes the Federal Rules "have lost credibility
as avatars of procedural reform."' 5 Indeed, he suggests that federal procedure
may be "less influential in state courts today than at anytime in the past quarter-
century."16
State court systems that once were replicas of the federal model have
failed to keep pace with an increasing number of amendments to the Federal
Rules. The original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enacted in 1938 were
substantially amended in 1948, 1961, 1963, 1966, 1970, 1980, 1983, 1985,
1991, 1993, 2000 and 2001.17 Another set of amendments took effect on
December 1, 2002,18 and still another set in the queue will likely take effect on
December 1, 2003.19 Most of the original Federal Rules have been amended at
least three times.2 ° Only ten of the original Federal Rules have never been
LEGAL EDUC. 14 (1986) ("[S]tudents without law degrees set the standards for publication in
the scholarly journals of American law - one of the few reported cases of the inmates truly
running the asylum."). See also Mary Beth Beazley & Linda H. Edwards, The Process and
the Product: A Bibliography of Scholarship About Legal Scholarship, 49 MERCER L. REV.
741 (1998).
12 See John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354
(2003).
13 See Thomas Wall Shelton, A New Era of Judicial Relations, 23 CASE & COMMENT 388,"
393 (1916) (federal rules "would prove a model that would, for reasons of convenience as
well as of principle, be adopted by the states"); Charles Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23
WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 307 (1938) ("The new federal reform is likely ... to have an important
effect, beyond the direct and immediate changes it makes in federal practice, in setting the
standard and tone of procedural reform throughout the country generally."). See generally
Thomas 0. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of
Intra-State Uniformity in Three States that Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 46 VILLANOVA L. REV. 311, 320-321 (2001).
1" Oakley, supra note 12; John B. Oakley, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of
State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986) [hereinafter Oakley,
Federal Rules in State Courts].
1' Oakley, supra note 12, at 355.
16 Id.
17 See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, U.S. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WITH SELECTED
STATUTES AND CASES (2002).
18 Available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct101/CVRedline.pdf (last accessed Feb.
11, 2003).
19 Available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proposed021502.htm (last accessed Feb. 11,
2003).
20 See FED. R. Civ. P. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31,
32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 43, 44, 45, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 58, 59, 60, 62, 68, 69, 71 (see
71A), 72, 73, 77, 79, 81, 82, and 86.
Winter 2002/2003]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
amended.2 ' In light of this proliferation of amendments to the Federal Rules,
states that were once replicas have failed to keep pace. It is now at least "argu-
able that there are no longer any true replicas of the [Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure] to be found among the local procedural systems of the fifty states
and the District of Columbia. '22 This conclusion, noting the demise of textual
conformity, confirms Professor Oakley's prescience; he predicted as much in
his 1986 study.23
Nevertheless, beneath this veneer of dissimilar formal rules, uniformity in
fact or practice may exist. Put another way, conformity may exist, but in a way
that our superficial or formal surveys examining textual adoption do not cap-
ture. Query, for example, whether state court trial judges require a discovery
conference a la Federal Rule 26(f), even if the state court rules committees have
not incorporated such a rule into their civil rules package? 24 Do state court
judges manage their cases like federal court judges even without the express
authority given to the latter pursuant to Federal Rule 16?25 Do state court
judges impose limits on discovery even without the benefit of the presumptive
limits similar to those recently written into the Federal Rules?2 6 Such ques-
tions focus on the standard applied in practice in the state courts. For indeed,
there may be substantial conformity in fact, notwithstanding superficial differ-
ences between the federal and state rules. Of course, textual adoption and for-
mal uniformity may have its own independent benefit, but if there is uniformity
21 See FED. R. Civ. P. 2, 3, 10, 21, 39, 40, 61, 64, 70, and 85.
22 Oakley, supra note 12, at 355.
23 See Oakley, Federal Rules in State Courts, supra note 14, at 1427 ("[Tjhe momentum of
the Federal Rules as a model for state court reform has subsided ....").
24 For a discussion of the history and purposes of a discovery conference under Federal Rule
26(f), see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Rulemaking: Errors of
Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 545-46 & n.88 (2001) (describing the 1980 amendments to
Federal Rule 26 authorizing discovery conferences with judicial supervision); Richard L.
Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 772-74 (1998) (discussing the
1980 and 1993 amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(0). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f), 48
F.R.D. 487 (1980), 146 F.R.D. 443-44 (1993).
25 For a discussion of the history and purposes of case management under Federal Rule 16,
see Myron J. Bromberg & Jonathan M. Korn, Individual Judges' Practices: An Inadvertent
Subversion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1994);
Michael E. Tigar, Pretrial Case Management Under the Amended Rules: Too Many Words
for a Good Idea, 14 REV. LINIG. 137, 157 (1994); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990
Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1589 (1994); Carl Tobias Judicial Discretion
and the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933, 933-52
(1991); David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemak-
ing, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969 (1989); Thomas D. Lambros, The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: A New Adversarial Model for a New Era, 50 U. PIT. L. REV. 789 (1989); A.
MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 7-8 (1984);
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982).
26 For a discussion of the history and purposes of presumptive limits on the use (and dura-
tion) of discovery devices, see Gregory S. Weber, Potential Innovations in Civil Discovery:
Lessons for California From the State and Federal Courts, 32 McGEORGE L. REV. 1051
(2001); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the "Haves" a Little More: Considering the 1998
Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229 (1999); Carl Tobias, Discovery Reform Redux,
31 CONN. L. REV. 1433 (1999).
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in fact, this would certainly change the tenor, if not the urgency, of any conver-
sation about textual uniformity.
The empirical support that I offer is a survey of pleading and summary
judgment standards in the federal and state courts of three states that, according
to Professor Oakley's 1986 landmark study, are among the state court systems
least influenced by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; all three, Penn-
sylvania, Illinois, and Nebraska, are code pleading states.27 The methodology
and conclusions of this study were set forth in an article that appeared two
years ago in the Villanova Law Review.2 8 Those findings and conclusions
serve as a useful reference point for the overwhelming question posed here.
I traced the evolution of the quantum of factual specificity required of
plaintiffs filing civil rights complaints in the federal and state courts of the
three aforementioned states. The federal courts were, of course, from 1938
forward bound by the liberal notice pleading requirement of Federal Rule
8(a). 2 9 Since the proliferation of code pleading in the latter half of the nine-
teenth century, state codes have required plaintiffs to plead the facts constitut-
ing the cause of action.3° The difference between the standards of fact pleading
under the codes and notice pleading under the Federal Rules was thought to be
significant, even revolutionary.3 1 Yet this formal difference seemed far less
significant, indeed superficial, in practice.
Animating the survey data was the well-documented evolution of the
pleading standard in civil rights cases.3 2 Beginning in the 1970s and continu-
27 See Oakley, Federal Rules in State Courts, supra note 14, at 1367; Main, supra note 13,
at 374.
28 Main, supra note 13, at 326 n.61.
29 See generally Charles Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297 (1938);
Charles Clark & James William Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387
(1935); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
30 See 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §2-603(a) (West 1983); PA. R. Civ. P. 1019(a); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1019 (West 2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-804, repealed by 2002 NEB.
LAWS L.B. 876. See generally AN ACT TO SIMPLIFY AND ABRIDGE THE PRACTICE, PLEAD-
INGS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURTS OF THIs STATE, ch. 379 § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. LAWS
521 (adoption by the State of New York of the Field Code, the progenitor of code reforms);
Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an
Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311 (1988); Mildred Coe & Lewis Morse,
Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238
(1942); CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN
AMERICA AND ENGLAND (1897).
31 See generally Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REV. 491,
494-97 (1910) (discussing function of pleadings); ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE OF THE TRIAL COURTS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 190 (1952) (discussing history of
pleading); Subrin, supra note 30, at 322 (discussing how drafters of Federal Rules made
enormous change from codes when flexible aspects of equity were adopted); Mark D. Rob-
ins, The Resurgence and Limits of the Demurrer, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 637, 641 (1993)
(offering historical context for pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Main,
supra note 13, at 327-28 (discussing significance of change in pleading regimes).
32 See, e.g., A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1580-81 n.49 (1991) (citing examples of civil rights cases where
heightened pleading requirements were imposed); Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous:
Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 935, 949 (1990) ("As a general rule notice pleading is sufficient, but an exception
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ing thereafter, federal circuit courts of appeals adopted a heightened pleading
standard for civil rights plaintiffs; notwithstanding Federal Rule 8(a), all of the
circuits had adopted such a requirement by the mid-1980s. 33 The Supreme
Court's decision in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit abruptly reversed this trend. 34 The Court held unanimously
that Rule 8(a) "meant what it said," and civil rights plaintiffs were to enjoy the
same liberal standard of notice pleading. 35 The Supreme Court recently
repeated this mandate, reversing a decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit that permitted the imposition of a heightened
pleading requirement in an employment discrimination case.36
Turning briefly to the survey data, the pleading standards in the federal
and state courts in the state of Illinois have evolved in lockstep. The data sug-
gest that fact pleading crept into the jurisprudence of both the federal and state
courts in the 1970s,3 7 it predominated by the early 1980s,3 8 and it was formally
adopted in the mid 1980s.39 And after the Court's Leatherman decision, the
demand for factual specificity cooled in both the federal and state courts.4 °
Throughout this entire period, of course, the federal court ostensibly applied
has been created for cases brought under the Civil Rights Acts."); Evan Sanford Schwartz, A
Plea for Help: Pleading Problems in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Claims, 6 ToURO L.
REV. 377, 378 (1990) (noting that popular technique to limit civil rights claims is heightened
pleading standard); Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 299 (1989) (discussing various civil rights cases in which
heightened pleading was required); Richard Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 436 (1986) (noting inappropriate
use of fact pleading requirements as step towards discretionary dismissals); C. Keith Win-
gate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil Rights Complaints: A Step Forward or a Step Back?,
49 Mo. L. REV. 677, 683 (1984) (discussing history of specificity requirements in civil rights
complaints); Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551 (2002)
(evaluating heightened pleading standards and procedural alternatives thereto).
33 See, e.g., Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 665 (1st Cir. 1979); Fine v. N.Y., 529 F.2d 70,
73 (2d Cir. 1975); Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976); Smith
v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 592 F.2d 225, 226 (4th Cir. 1979); Jewell v. City of Coving-
ton, 425 F.2d 459, 460 (5th Cir. 1970); Place v. Shepherd, 446 F.2d 1239, 1244 (6th Cir.
1971); Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1985); Morton v. Becker, 793
F.2d 185, 188 (8th Cir. 1986); Uston v. Airport Casino, Inc., 564 F.2d 1216, 1217 (9th Cir.
1977); Coopersmith v. Sup. Ct., 465 F.2d 993, 994 (10th Cir. 1972); Hobson v. Wilson, 737
F.2d 1, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
34 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
35 Id. at 168 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
36 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (holding that complaint in an
employment discrimination lawsuit must contain only a short and plain statement of the
claim and need not contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case).
31 See, e.g., Ehrlich v. Van Epps, 428 F.2d 363, 364 (7th Cir. 1970); Morse v. Nelson, 363
N.E.2d 167 (I11. App. Ct. 1977). See also Main, supra note 13, at 335-36, 339-42.
38 See, e.g., Cohen v. Ill. Inst. of Tech., 581 F.2d 658, 663 (7th Cir. 1978); Doyle v. Shlen-
sky, 458 N.E.2d 1120, 1127 (I11. App. Ct. 1983). See also Main, supra note 13, at 336, 341-
42.
39 See, e.g., Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1985); Brown v.
Michael Reese Health Plan, Inc., 502 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). See also Main,
supra note 13, at 336-38, 341-42.
40 See, e.g., Triad Associates, Inc. v. Robinson, 10 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 1993); Doe v.




Federal Rule 8(a), and the state court applied the code pleading requirement
that plaintiffs plead facts constituting the cause of action. Hence, there was
substantial uniformity in fact, notwithstanding the formal differences.
The same phenomenon was observed in the pleading standards imposed
on civil rights plaintiffs in the federal and state courts of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. In Pennsylvania, however, the shift to fact pleading occurred
much earlier than in Illinois.41 Also, there was a lag of nearly a decade
between federal and state court adoption of the heightened pleading standard.4 2
The Pennsylvania federal courts had signaled their retreat to a standard of
notice pleading even prior to Leatherman; again after a lag, a similar trend was
observed in the state courts. 4 3 Hence, these data demonstrate substantial uni-
formity in fact - eventually.
Intra-state uniformity also was realized in the pleading standards imposed
upon civil rights plaintiffs by the federal and state courts in Nebraska. 44 The
most notable finding in the courts of that state, however, was that both the
federal and state courts resisted the transition from fact back to notice pleading,
notwithstanding the mandate of the Supreme Court's Leatherman decision on
the federal courts.45
Looking at the data set as a whole, then, there was substantial intra-state
uniformity even under the fundamentally different regimes of notice pleading
and code pleading. Importantly, the data also demonstrate substantial interstate
disuniformity. Indeed, the pleading standards transitioned at different times in
the three states.46 Also, the intra-state uniformity was manifest differently in
each - Illinois federal and state courts evolving in lockstep; Pennsylvania
evolving with a lag; and Nebraska not really evolving much at all.47
To better understand these data, I also looked at the federal and state court
summary judgment standards in light of the 1986 decision in Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, where the Supreme Court re-characterized the movant's evidentiary
burden that the Court previously had set forth in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.48
41 See Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976); Law v. Fisher, 399
A.2d 453, 457 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979). See also Main, supra note 13, at 345-47, 349-50.
42 See also Main, supra note 13, at 351.
43 See, e.g., Frazier v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 785 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1985); Holder v. City of
Allentown, 987 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1993); Stone & Edwards Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Dept. of Ins.,
616 A.2d 1060 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992); Heinly v. Commonwealth, 621 A.2d 1212 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1993).
4 See Main, supra note 13, at 354-59.
45 See, e.g., Walker v. M.D. Reed, 104 F.3d 156, 157-58 (8th Cir. 1997); Christianson v.
Educ. Serv. Unit No. 16, 501 N.W.2d 281 (Neb. 1993). See also Main, supra note 13, at
356-59.
46 For example, federal courts in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania adopted fact pleading
a full decade before their federal counterparts within the State of Illinois. Consider also that
both the federal and state courts in Pennsylvania had shifted back toward a standard of notice
pleading before the federal and state courts in Illinois commenced their retreat; indeed, the
Pennsylvania shift occurred even before the Supreme Court's decision in Leatherman. See
Main, supra note 13, at 370-74.
41 See Main, supra note 13, at 370-74.
48 See Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 161 (1970) (noting "[t]he party moving for
summary judgment has the burden to show that he is entitled to judgment under established
principles"); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (noting that moving party
may satisfy its burden by establishing "absence of evidence" in support of opposing party's
Winter 2002/2003]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
Because all three of the survey states had adopted, for their state rules, a sum-
mary judgment rule that was identical (or nearly so) to Federal Rule 56, this
data set operated somewhat like a control group.4 9 The findings were
extraordinary.
In Illinois, the federal courts were applying a Celotex-like standard even
before the Supreme Court's 1986 decision.50 The state courts adopted the new
standard three years after their federal counterparts.5 1 Notably, then, the state
courts incorporated the federal court pleading standard into their dissimilar
code faster than they adopted the federal court summary judgment standard for
their textually-identical summary judgment rule.5 2
In Pennsylvania, both the federal and state courts have abandoned the
Adickes standard and have adopted a standard consistent with the Supreme
Court's decision in Celotex.5 3 The Pennsylvania federal courts immediately
transitioned to the new standard.54 Two years later, in a case with facts
remarkably similar to those in Celotex, a Pennsylvania Superior Court judge
applied the new standard by acknowledging a departure from earlier state case
law, but made no mention of the Celotex case.5 The Pennsylvania Supreme
court declined to hear the appeal in that case, and the new standard was in
place.5 6 Hence, there was intra-state uniformity, albeit with a short lag.
The Nebraska data set again was aberrational. The Nebraska federal
courts were very slow to transition to the Celotex standard, but ultimately did
so.1 7 The Nebraska state courts still apply an Adickes-like standard.5 8 Accord-
claim or defense). See generally Steven Alan Childress, A New Era for Summary Judg-
ments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183 (1987); Gary T. Foremaster, The
Movant's Burden in a Motion for Summary Judgment, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 731 (1987).
" The text of the relevant sections of the Illinois and Nebraska Codes differ from Federal
Rule 56 only in very minor respects. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1005(c) (West
1992) (differing from the Federal Rule in that it does not expressly include consideration of
"answers to interrogatories" upon motions for summary judgment); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
1332 (West 1992) (same). Until 1996, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure copied the
Federal Rule verbatim. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1035 (West 1994). In 1996, the Pennsylvania
legislature amended the state summary judgment rule. See Order Amending Rule 1035,
promulgated Feb. 5, 1996. Among other changes, the new rule states that a party may move
for summary judgment where "an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has
failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury
trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury." PA. R. Civ. P. 1035.2; 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1035 (West 2000). The Pennslyvania legislature thus effectively codified the
Celotex standard.
50 See, e.g., Am. Nurses Ass'n v. State of Ill., 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986).
5' See, e.g., Guthrie v. Zielinski, 541 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (applying Adickes-like
standard to summary judgment motion); Estate of Henderson v. W.R. Grace Co., 541 N.E.2d
805 (I11. App. Ct. 1989) (adopting a Celotex-like standard). See generally Main, supra note
13, at 364-65.
52 See Main, supra note 13, at 372.
51 See, e.g., Falcone v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 805 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1986); Eck-
enrod v. GAF Corp., 544 A.2d 50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). See Main, supra note 13, at 366-
67.
54 See Falcone, 805 F.2d at 115.
5 See Eckenrod, 544 A.2d at 53.
56 See, e.g., Myers v. Penn Traffic Co., 606 A.2d 926, 928 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
17 See, e.g., Cambee's Furniture, Inc. v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 825 F.2d 167, 174
(8th Cir. 1987) ("The burden of establishing the non-existence of any genuine issue of mate-
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ingly, for more than a decade the federal and state courts in Nebraska have
applied different summary judgment standards, notwithstanding identical tex-
tual mandates.5 9
Based on those findings, I have argued that the dramatic state-to-state vari-
ation and other factors suggest that a local legal culture can influence the appli-
cation of formal rules.6 ° A legal culture refers to the composite of shared
norms, experiences, expectations and values of lawyers, judges and other insti-
tutional forces (whether legal or non-legal) that, while not necessarily reflected
in the textual rules, nonetheless inhere in the standards that are applied.6 That
assimilating role of a local legal culture is an example of what I suggest here is
part of an overwhelming question about the role of non-formal forms of law.
To what extent must our superficial, or formal, proposals and critiques contem-
plate these forms? Can we, how can we, ignore their potential influence?
So, for a professor in love with the field of procedure and smitten by rules,
this love song, too, poses an overwhelming question about future relationships.
The formal rules are our tools, yet they undoubtedly are superficial. Indeed, the
end product is so much more, or even worse, so much different, because of
certain non-formal factors at work. Albert Einstein has remarked that most
mistakes in philosophy and logic occur because the human mind is apt to take
the symbol for the reality.62 Where is procedural reality? If we are to truly
understand dispute resolution in the twenty-first century, must we transcend the
superficial, the formal, and the textual rules?
Exactly how does one ascertain or describe the scope, operation and
evolution of those non-formal norms? Importantly, non-formal procedure is not
informal procedure. The adjective informal connotes a casual or improvisa-
tional quality that belies the gravity of these non-formal rules. Indeed, much of
the intrigue and significance of these non-formal rules is that they are rules or
forms of law nonetheless. These forms establish norms and change outcomes.
The formal procedural Rules are but a metaphor for the rules.
Remember Plato's famous allegory about the prisoners in the cave. In
Book Seven of the Republic,6 3 Plato describes the inhabitants of the cave as
prisoners, "their legs and necks fettered from childhood, so that they remain in
rial fact is on the moving party."); see also id. at 174 ("Nothing in the affidavits submitted
by [defendant] purports to negate the existence of [the material] facts .... Therefore defen-
dant did not meet its initial burden ... and summary judgment must be denied notwithstand-
ing the absence of opposing affidavits or other evidence.") (FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
51 See, e.g., Roubideaux v. Davenport, 530 N.W.2d 232, 235 (Neb. 1995) ("In the absence
of a prima facie showing by the movant that she is entitled to summary judgment, the oppos-
ing party is not required to reveal evidence which [sic] she expects to produce at trial to
prove the allegations contained in her petition.").
59 See, e.g., Rouse v. Benson, 193 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 1999); Fackler v. Genetzky, 595
N.W.2d 884, 890 (Neb. 1999).
60 Main, supra note 13, at 370-79.
61 See generally Braucher, supra note 9, at 518; Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances Kahn
Zemans, Local Legal Culture and the Control of Litigation, 27 LAW & Soc'v REv. 535,
537-38 (1993); LoPucki, supra note 9, at 1502; Andrea M. Seielstad, Unwritten Laws and
Customs, Local Legal Cultures and Clinical Legal Education, 6 CLINICAL L. REv. 127, 136
(1999); Sullivan et al., supra note 9, at 804.
62 ALBERT EINSTEIN, CosMIc RELIGION 101 (Codovici Fried ed., 1931).
63 PLATO, REPUBLIC 514A-521C.
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the same spot, able to look forward only, and prevented by the fetters from
turning their heads." There is but one light from a fire burning higher up and at
a distance behind them. The prisoners' only interaction with each other is
through their respective shadows that appear on a wall. Whether accurate por-
trayals or grotesque distortions, the prisoners ultimately "believe" the shadows
that they see. Because the prisoners have never been out in the sun where
things are clear, they are unable to form the criteria necessary to judge the
shadows - that is their only reality.6 4
Well, frankly, as a proceduralist, I prefer the superficial rules - the form,
the text. I am not a cultural critic,6 5 social scientist,66 anthropologist,6 7 psy-
chologist,68 organizational theorist,69 nor a trained empiricist. 70  My over-
' See Marshall Berman, Notes from Underground, HARVARD DESIGN MAGAZINE, Fall
2001, Number 15.
65 For works incorporating law and the humanities, see e.g., MILNER S. BALL, THE PROMISE
OF AMERICAN LAW: A THEOLOGICAL, HUMANISTIC VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS (1981); JAMES
BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM
(1990).
66 For works incorporating social science literature, see, e.g., John M. Conley, The Social
Science of Ideology and the Ideology of Social Science, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1249 (1994)
("examin[ing] the impact of ideology on legal education and the legal profession from the
analytical perspective of the social scientist" as well as the impact social science has had on
the law itself); David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social
Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989) (describing how
judges and legislators can better use social science to understand fundamental human behav-
ior and how individuals might respond to factual situations); John Monahan and Laurens
Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 488 (1986) (arguing that "courts should treat social science research
relevant to creating a rule of law as a source of authority rather than as a source of facts").
67 For works incorporating the literature of anthropology, see, e.g., Elizabeth Mertz, Teach-
ing Lawyers the Language of Law: Legal and Anthropological Translations, 34 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 91, 114 (2000) (finding that law school classrooms "convey a distinctive
approach to language, text, authority, and morality"); Annelise Riles, Representing In-
Between: Law, Anthropology, and the Rhetoric of Interdisciplinarity, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
597 (1995) (critiquing the "rigid opposition" between the fields of law and anthropology and
"argu[ing] that the task of relating law and anthropology as disciplines ... has now lost its
rhetorical force").
68 For works incorporating the literature of the study of psychology, see, e.g., Mark I. Satin,
Law and Psychology: A Movement Whose Time Has Come, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 581,
630 (1995) (advocating a law and psychology movement to rival the law and economics
movement); Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure's Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases
for Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115 (1987) (studying the tie between the
use of the number three in procedural issues); Thibaut and Walker, A Theory of Procedure,
66 CAL. L. Rav. 541 (1978) (examining procedure through applying theories of social psy-
chology and proposing a "general theory of procedure for resolving conflicts").
69 For works integrating organizational theory into legal studies, see, e.g., Lauren B.
Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the "Haves" Hold Court: Speculations on the Organi-
zational Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 941, 968 (1999) (stating that "[a]t its
core, the entire internalization enterprise rests on the public legal system's willingness to
cede jurisdiction to those organizational forums that persuasively mimic their public counter-
parts"); Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMagio, eds., Symposium: Legal Rational Myths: The
New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAW & SoC. INQUIRY 903
(1996).
70 For works discussing the value of empiricism, see Thomas E. Willging, Past and Poten-
tial Uses of Empirical Research in Civil Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121 (2002)
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whelming question is must I, must we proceduralists, transcend the superficial
and seek reality beyond the shadows? Should every proposed rule change first
be studied to determine how the current rule is applied in fact and then again to
see how the revision is applied in fact? What if it is not applied as written?
What role for rules then, amend and try again? If we acknowledge the influ-
ence of non-formal rules of procedure, apparently we must develop a culture
that nurtures the environment and all of its attendant non-formal factors so that
the rule is more likely to be "followed." Hence, the overwhelming question is
whether to engage in a relationship with a field of procedure that transcends the
superficial. I am not sure that I want to. I am not sure that I can. I am not sure
whether I must. Indeed, the protagonist in the poem ultimately did not engage
either, though he did "measure [the rest of his] life with coffee spoons" until he
drowned.7"
(reviewing and explaining the uses of empirical research in the adoption and evolution of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and calling for further use of such research in order to
create better rules); Robert G. Bone, The Empirical Turn in Procedural Rule Making: Com-
ment on Walker, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 595 (1994); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil
Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67 (1988)
(recommending empirical research on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prior to the adop-
tion of amendments); Frank Munger, Law, Change, and Litigation: A Critical Examination
of an Empirical Research Tradition, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 57 (1988).
71 See T.S. ELIOT, supra note 1. Throughout the poem there are several references to the
question whether or not to engage. After an early reference to an "overwhelming question,"
the poem asks "Do I dare [d]isturb the Universe?" and later, "And how should I begin?" Yet
he doesn't begin, because "in short, I was afraid." Following this choice, the protagonist
considers whether or not it would have even been worth it to live that engaged life. He was
not "Prince Hamlet," but rather "an attendant lord" and "[a]lmost, at times, the Fool." The
protagonist did not hear "the mermaids singing" and drowns in the last line of the poem. See
generally E. K. Sparks, Abyss Notes for T.S. Eliot's "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,"
available at http://virtual.clemson.edu/groups/dial/t&vseminar/prufaby.htm (last accessed
Feb. 11, 2003); KATHLEEN McCoY AND JUDITH HARLAN, ENGLISH LITERATURE FROM 1785,
265-266 (1992); Modem American Poetry, "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock," available
at http://www.english.uiuc.edu/maps/poets/a-f/eliot/prufrock.htm#criticism (last accessed
Feb. 11, 2003); Jough Dempsey, "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" - T.S. Eliot, availa-
ble at http://www.plagiarist.com/articles/?artid=17 (last accessed Feb. 11, 2003). See also
CRASH TEST DUMMIES, Afternoons and Coffeespoons, on GOD SHUFFLED His FEET
(Polygram Int'l Publ'g 1993).
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